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Mind	the	Gap:	Implications	of	Overseas	Investment	for	Regional	House	Price	Divergence	in	Britain	Chris	Hamnett	and	Jonathan	Reades	Abstract	The	UK	has	had	a	long	standing	regional	house	price	gap	with	London	much	less	affordable	than	the	rest	of	the	UK.	Using	price	data	from	1969–2017	we	track	price	differentials	through	several	cycles	of	boom	and	bust,	and	note	the	growing	divergence	of	London,	particularly	central	London,	from	the	rest	of	Britain.	In	explaining	this	divergence,	we	highlight	the	growing	importance	of	international	investment	since	the	global	financial	crisis.	We	conclude	that,	although	‘Brexit’	may	have	brought	the	latest	long	London	boom	to	a	close,	there	is	nothing	to	suggest	that	the	regional	house	price	gap	will	close.	Given	the	ongoing	importance	of	global	financial	inflows	to	major	world	cities,	this	has	significant	implications	for	how	governments	approach	affordability	and	housing	policy.		Introduction	Almost	all	countries	exhibit	some	form	of	spatially	uneven	economic	development.	In	developed	countries,	one	common	manifestation	of	this	is	the	distribution	of	residential	property	prices.	Traditionally,	this	is	thought	to	be	due	to	endogenous	differences	in	regional	economic	prosperity	and	the	role	of	higher	earnings/incomes	pushing	up	prices	in	more	prosperous	or	attractive	areas	and	depressing	them	in	others.	However,	these	differentials	have	become	particularly	marked	in	the	high	prices	which	characterise	most	of	the	world’s	major	financial	and	business	centres	such	as	New	York,	Toronto,	Paris,	Beijing,	Shanghai	and	Sydney.	Britain	is	no	exception	to	this:	the	market	has	a	strong	South/North	divide	with	average	prices	in	Inner	London	currently	at	4.8	times	those	of	Northern	cities	such	as	Newcastle	(Tyne	and	Wear)	or	Liverpool	(Merseyside).	The	decade	since	the	financial	crisis	therefore	raises	an	important	question	regarding	inter-regional	house	price	gaps:	the	run	of	record-breaking	prices	in	London	suggests	a	range	of	potential	exogenous	factors	in	play—we	focus	here	on	international	investment—that	have	little	to	do	with	local	changes	in	income,	and	this	calls	into	question	some	underlying	principles	of	neo-classical	housing	market	models	and	consequently	has	important	implications	for	affordability	and	for	housing	policy.		A	substantial	inter-regional	difference	should,	according	to	neo-classical	theory,	encourage	the	migration	of	households	and	businesses	to	lower-cost	locations,	resulting	in	the	long-run	
convergence	of	incomes	and	economic	growth	even	if	at	a	fairly	slow	rate	(e.g.	Barro	et	al.,	1991).	In	a	housing	context,	it	is	reasonable	to	expect	that	the	impact	of	this	migration	would	
then	be	observed	in	a	set	of	pricing	ripples	spreading	out	over	time	from	the	capital	to	places	such	as	Brighton	or	Bristol	(see:	Evans	2017;	DTZ	2008)	and	in	the	existence	of	an	implicit	cap	on	property	values	tied	to	price-to-earnings	multiples	as	well	as	softening	demand.	Of	course,	many	economists	recognise	that	factors	such	as	education,	sunk	costs,	place	attachment,	and	regional	development	complicate	this	picture	substantially	and	there	remains	an	active	debate	regarding	the	rate	and	type	of	convergence—absolute	or	relative—and	their	co-occurrence	(e.g.	Sala-I-Martin	1996,	Young	et	al.	2008).	So	it	is	broadly	expected	that,	even	if	real	property	prices	do	not	converge,	the	inter-regional	ratios—the	regional	house	price	multiples,	in	other	words—should	stabilise	rather	than	continue	to	widen	(e.g.	Holmes	and	Grimes	2008).	However,	critical	theorists	have	long	argued	that	interregional	differences	could	persist	indefinitely,	or	even	intensify	(Smith,	1984),	and	Myrdal’s	theory	of	cumulative	and	circular	causation	(1957)	also	suggests	that	regional	inequalities	can	intensify	over	time:	under-developed	regions	in	countries	like	Italy	or	Britain	can	suffer	from	‘backwash	effects’	that	reinforce	the	advantages	of	more	prosperous	regions	such	as	Piedmont,	or	London	and	the	South	East,	while	the	freer	movement	of	goods,	services,	and	capital	movements	would	exacerbate	inequality	(Myrdal	1959,	p.28).	The	continued	rapid	appreciation	of	prices	in	London	and	depressed	housing	markets	in	peripheral	regions	since	the	onset	of	the	Global	Financial	Crisis	(GFC)	adds	to	this	view	of	the	limits	of	the	neoclassical	approach.	Given	the	impact	of	the	crisis	on	the	banking	sector,	we	might	have	expected	a	significant	decline	in	property	values	in	major	financial	centres,	but	aside	from	a	short,	sharp	correction	this	has	not	happened.	By	the	4th	Quarter	of	2009	average	prices	in	London	had	already	surpassed	their	pre-GFC	peak	and	by	far	the	biggest	impacts	were	felt	elsewhere	in	America	and	Britain.	So	while	the	historical	data	shows	the	expected	cycles	and	a	strong	‘ripple	effect’	emanating	from	London	(Meen	1999;	Cook	and	Watson	2015),	the	magnitude	of	the	gap	between	London	and	the	rest	of	Britain	has	widened	during	each	cycle	to	surprisingly	little	attention	from	researchers	and	we	argue	below	that	this	may	be	connected	two	things:	first,	that	housing	in	London	is	both	shelter	and	(often	international)	investment	vehicle;	and	second,	that	there	is	an	absence	of	policy	levers	able	to	distinguish	effectively	between	the	‘use’	and	investment	roles	of	property.	However,	it	is	not	the	purpose	of	this	paper	to	model	this	process,	but	to	point	out	that	its	existence	would	call	into	question	underlying	assumptions—and	resulting	policy	choices—about	the	behaviour	of	housing	markets	in	an	era	of	globalisation.	Indeed,	the	work	of	Fernandez	et	al.	(2016),	Ley	(2017),	Walks	(2014),	Moos	and	Skaburskis	(2010),	and	Ley	and	Tutchener	(2001)	on	the	role	of	cities	such	as	London	and	New	York	and	Vancouver	as	‘safe	deposit	boxes’	for	the	global	elite	point	to	the	increasing	role	of	international	capital	and	investment	flows	in	pushing	up	property	prices.	This	issue	poses	the	question	of	whether	prices	in	some	of	the	world’s	major	cities	are	now	driven,	at	least	in	part,	by	global	financial	
investment	flows	rather	than	by	purely	domestic	factors	and	the	policy	implications	that	might	flow	from	continued	price	divergence.	To	the	extent	that	this	is	correct,	it	could	cast	further	doubt	on	neo-classical	arguments	regarding	convergence	and	the	appropriate	response	to	global	investment	flows.	We	investigate	these	questions	in	a	specifically	British	context,	focusing	on	the	evolution	of	the	regional	house	price	gap	between	London	and	the	rest	of	Britain	since	the	late	1960s.	Why	history	matters	A	frustrating	characteristic	of	most	media	discussions	of	house	prices	in	Britain	is	its	pervasive	short-term	focus:	in	a	kind	of	Groundhog	Day,	a	reader	could	flip	between	articles	from	the	1980s,	1990s,	and	2000s	and,	changing	only	the	year,	find	similar	fears	of	a	boom	or	bust	in	London	and	its	likely	impact	on	the	remainder	of	the	country.	When	there	is	a	boom,	and	we	have	now	witnessed	four	since	the	early	1970s,	the	media	focus	on	the	fact	that	for	the	price	of	a	flat	or	small	terraced	house	in	London	it	is	just	about	possible	to	buy	a	whole	terrace	of	houses	in	some	depressed	part	of	Northern	England,	or	even	a	modest	baronial	estate	in	Scotland	(e.g.	Ivey	2017).	When	the	gap	between	average	prices	in	London	and	those	elsewhere	reaches	its	greatest	extent,	the	example	is	usually	wheeled	out	of	some	miniscule	pied-à-terre	apartment	or	‘broom	cupboard’	in	Kensington―usually	close	to	Harrods―which	has	sold	for	an	astronomical	sum.	Earlier	modelling	work	on	booms	and	busts	(Muellbauer	and	Murphy	1997)	at	the	UK-scale	had	argued	that	these	were	driven	by	debt-to-income	ratios,	expectations	of	future	rises	or	falls	in	one	or	both	measures,	and	non-linear	effects	(i.e.	feedback)	amongst	other	things.	Perhaps	optimistically,	Muellbauer	and	Murphy	(ibid.)	went	so	far	as	to	argue	that	“three	forces	will	dampen	the	next	upturn:	unfavourable	demographic	trends,	high	levels	of	debt	and	high	real	after	tax	interest	rates…	[and]	greater	awareness	by	mortgage	lends	of	default	risk…”	The	trajectory	of	house	prices	in	London	and	the	South	East	suggests	that	that	confidence	was	misplaced;	however,	it	has	also	long	been	the	case	that	house	prices	are	much	higher	in	London	and	the	South	East	than	they	are	in	the	rest	of	Britain	so	it’s	hard	to	know	quite	how	to	reconcile	national,	regional,	and	local	differences.		In	fact,	the	existence	of	a	Regional	House	Price	Gap	(henceforth	RHPG)	can	be	traced	back	at	least	as	far	the	late	1960s	using	official	house	price	data,	but	by	Q4	2016,	the	mean	property	price	in	England	&	Wales	(Scottish	data	is	no	longer	integrated)	was	£283,000,	while	in	London	it	was	£532,000	(1.88	times	higher).	Meanwhile,	in	the	North	East,	the	cheapest	region,	the	average	was	just	£172,000:	61%	and	32%	of	the	UK	and	London	averages	respectively.	There	is,	of	course,	considerable	variation	within	individual	regions	(Gray	2012),	with	high	prices	dotting	the	Midlands	and	the	North,	and	a	few	areas	of	lower	prices	in	London	and	the	South	East,	but	the	overall	trend	is	clear.	Put	simply,	Britain	has	a	very	large	and	very	long-running	
North/South	RHPG	in	which	proximity	to	London	has	always	been	the	best	predictor	of	a	region’s	prices	relative	to	its	neighbours.	The	gap	has	survived	four	major	residential	property	booms,	including	the	long	boom	running	from	the	mid-1990s	through	to	the	onset	of	the	GFC	in	2007/8,	though	Holmes	and	Grimes	(2008,	p.1542)	note	that	across	this	entire	period	“there	is	constancy	in	the	long-run	house	prices	ratios	between	all	regions”	even	though	the	absolute	size	of	the	gap	has	changed	considerably.	In	many	respects	the	North-South	divide	is	a	manifestation	of	a	deeper	North-South	gap	in	regional	economic	structure	and	prosperity.	This	difference	has	been	well	known	since	the	1930s,	if	not	earlier	(Martin	1988,	2010;	Dorling	2010),	and	it	seems	obvious	that	regional	house	price	differences	must	to	some	extent	reflect	differences	in	economic	conditions,	income	and	wealth.	To	get	a	sense	of	the	scale	of	this	dynamic:	between	2000	and	2010,	London	alone	created	more	new	jobs	than	the	next	ten	largest	British	cities	combined	(Webber	and	Swinney	2010,	pp.6–7)	and	the	South	East,	East	of	England,	and	London	regions	accounted	for	more	than	half	of	private	sector	jobs	created	in	the	UK	during	that	period	(ibid.).	More	recent	data	from	McGough	and	Piazza	(2016)	suggests	that	London	contributes	almost	as	much	in	tax	revenue	to	the	government	as	the	next	37	largest	cities	put	together.	A	large	gap	has	important	implications	for	both	households	and	governments:	first,	it	affects	the	distribution	of	housing	wealth	and	mortgage	debt;	second,	it	influences	the	level	and	direction	of	inter-regional	migration;	and	third,	it	may	have	an	unhealthy	impact	on	government	fiscal	policy.	With	more	wealth	tied	up	in	property	assets	than	ever	before,	the	room	to	manoeuvre	for	governments	is	drastically	reduced:	significant	transaction	costs	in	some	markets	mean	that	appreciation	is	required	simply	for	the	new	owner	to	avoid	being	‘underwater’	and	a	government	that	presided	over	falling	prices	would	soon	be	voted	out.	In	addition,	when	prices	(and	rents)	are	much	higher	in	one	city	than	another,	then	potential	migrants—even	highly	skilled	ones—may	stay	put	rather	than	relocate,	and	this	has	potentially	severe	implications	for	labour	mobility	and,	consequently,	economic	growth	(e.g.	Hamnett	1992).		Finally,	prior	to	the	financial	crisis	it	was	also	possible	to	claim	that	U.K.	interest	rate	policy	was	unduly	affected	by	the	desire	to	control	residential	property-led	booms	in	the	London	area	(e.g.	Peck	and	Tickell	1992),	but	that	this	was	having	detrimental	effects	on	the	rest	of	Britain	through	unnecessarily	high	rates.	Monetary	policy	was	also	the	motor	of	house	price	inflation	in	both	the	early	1970s	and	the	mid-late	1980s,	but	the	‘new	normal’	of	interest	rates	at	or	below	0.5%	means	that	a	‘loose’	monetary	policy—whether	domestic	or,	in	a	larger	sense,	global—is	clearly	going	to	have	an	important	effect	not	only	in	terms	of	overall	lending	(e.g.	Kim	and	Renaud	2009),	but	also	on	the	effectiveness	of	price	signals	in	the	capital.	A	longer-term	view	of	the	RHPG	suggests	additional	issues	that	must	be	understood	in	order	to	properly	contextualise	the	implications	of	our	findings.	In	the	1980s	and	90s,	Hamnett	(1983,		
1989,	1998)	showed	that	the	RHPG	could	be	traced	back	to	the	late	1960s,	and	more	recent	work	has	developed	evidence	of	a	‘ripple	effect’	in	which	increases	in	property	prices	start	in	London	and	the	South	East	and	then	diffuse	over	time	and	space	to	other,	lower-priced	areas	(Holmes	and	Grimes	2008;	Cook	and	Watson	2015;	Holly	et	al.	2011).	The	ripple	effect	is	not	unique	to	Britain,	and	has	been	observed	in	the	US	(Payne	2012)	and	South	Africa	(Balcilar	et	al.	2013)	amongst	others	(see	Cook	and	Watson	2015	for	an	extensive	bibliography),	and	even	if	results	from	New	Zealand	(Shi	et	al.	2009)	nuance	our	understanding	of	this	phenomenon,	spatial	structure	undoubtedly	plays	a	role	in	the	observed	outcomes.	Meen	(1999)	takes	a	more	sceptical	view	of	spillover	effects	as	the	driver	of	the	pricing	ripple	in	the	UK,	suggesting	that	debt	gearing,	income,	and	unemployment	differences	may	play	as	significant	a	role	as	spatial	interaction	effects	(e.g.	migration).	However,	the	GFC	and	its	aftermath	call	these	conclusions	into	question	since	several	of	the	‘usual’	dynamics—changes	in	interest	rates	and	incomes,	especially—are	not	obviously	in	play	since	both	have	been	essentially	flat	or	falling	since	the	onset	of	the	crisis.	Data	for	the	first	few	years	following	the	GFC	appear	to	show	London	recovering	quickly	and	strongly	while	the	rest	of	Britain	at	best	marked	time.	London	has	even	pulled	away	decisively	from	the	neighbouring	South	East	region,	and	it	is	for	this	reason	that	we	argue	that	the	‘ripple	effect’	has	been	overlaid	by	a	structural	divergence	between	regions	seemingly	triggered	by	changing	economic	and	investment	dynamics	at	a	global	scale	and	bringing	external	factors	into	play	in	the	domestic	housing	market.	Understanding	regional	house	prices	Regional	house	price	data	is	available	in	some	form	for	all	of	Britain	for	the	period	since	1969.	The	earliest	data	in	the	series	is	based	on	a	5%	sample	of	transactions	collected	by	building	societies,	which	were	then	the	dominant	mortgage	lending	institutions.	This	sample	was	subsequently	extended	to	include	the	data	from	major	retail	banks	when	they	entered	the	housing	market	in	the	early	1980s.	Consequently,	although	the	Land	Registry	(2017a)	has	recently	begun	to	track	cash-buyers	separately	from	mortgaged-buyers	such	data	is	not	available	over	the	long	run	that	forms	the	core	of	our	analysis.	So	while	some	data	is	available	for	a	variety	of	types	of	buyers—first-time	and	existing	owner-occupiers,	as	well	as	all	buyers—and	properties―newly	built	and	existing―the	simplest	and	most	representative	approach	to	dealing	with	the	varying	levels	of	data	provision	is	to	take	the	entire	market	‘as	is’	and	to	work	with	simple	regional	averages.	A	more	sophisticated	approach,	as	embodied	in	the	UK	House	Price	Index	(HPI)	would	incorporate	mix-adjustment,	but	this	severely	limits	the	amount	of	historical	data	available:	many	regions	have	no	mix-adjusted	prices	available	prior	to	1992.	Similarly,	although	the	median	would	be	more	robust	to	outliers	than	a	crude	mean,	this	data	is	also	not	available	prior	to	1995.	
Most	of	the	data	underpinning	this	analysis	were	originally	published	by	the	Department	of	the	Environment	(DoE)―and	its	successor,	the	Department	for	Communities	and	Local	Government	(DCLG)―as	statistical	Table	505	which	drew	on	a	sample	from	the	Regulated	Mortgage	Survey	(RMS)	and	so	never	captured	cash	transactions.	In	2010,	responsibility	for	this	data	set	was	transferred	to	the	Office	of	National	Statistics	(ONS),	which	instituted	several	changes	including	a	renumbering	of	the	table	(to	Table	24)	and	a	policy	of	rounding	the	RMS	data	to	the	nearest	£1,000.	Early	in	the	time	series,	such	as	in	1969	when	the	average	price	of	a	property	in	the	UK	was	just	£4,640,	the	rounding	has	an	appreciable	effect	on	the	results;	accordingly,	we	have	used	historical,	un-rounded	DoE/DCLG	figures	up	to	2010,	and	the	rounded	ONS	figures	from	2011	onwards.	To	reiterate:	we	use	the	simple	average	of	prices	and	they	are	not	mix-adjusted	since	such	data	is	not	available	before	the	1990s	and	changing	approaches	to	calculating	the	House	Price	Index	(the	ONS	HPI	was	replaced	by	the	UKHPI	in	June	2016)	may	cause	needless	confusion	in	the	results.	Although	up	to	40%	of	contemporary	property	purchases	are	now	known	to	be	cash	transactions	(HM	Land	Registry,	2017a),	this	number	is	significantly	lower	in	London	(25%),	though	still	far	from	negligible.	The	dearth	of	historical	data	makes	it	extremely	difficult	to	determine	the	extent	of	any	impact	on	our	analysis,	and	while	the	latest	summary	report	from	HM	Land	Registry	(2017b)	certainly	suggests	that	cash	buyers	(average	purchase	price	£506,000)	can	out-bid	those	using	mortgages	(average	purchase	price	£475,000)	in	principle,	in	practice	a	sampling	of	the	data	since	2012	suggests	little	overall	difference	in	price	paid.	
Regional	price	change	since	1969	As	noted	above,	the	principal	objective	of	the	paper	is	to	examine	to	what	extent	the	cycle	of	regional	house	price	change	noted	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	has	been	maintained	over	the	period	of	the	GFC	and	its	aftermath,	and	whether	the	previous	pattern	of	cyclical	variation	is	being	overlain	by	changes	rooted	London’s	role	in	a	global	real	estate	market	driven	by	highly	skilled	migrants	and	foreign	direct	investment.	Complicating	this	research	is	the	absence	of	good	data	on	sales	both	to	overseas	investors	and	to	domestic	Buy-To-Let	(BTL)	landlords	enabled	by	the	financialisation	of	mortgages	and	even,	in	some	cases,	by	their	ability	to	pay	cash	for	a	desirable	property	to	serve	as	both	income-generator	and	pension	pot.	Some	sense	of	the	extent	to	which	housing	operates	as	a	commodity	in	Britain	as	well	as	the	different	regional	dynamics	can	be	seen	in	the	fact	that,	since	1969,	nominal	prices	have	increased	by	4,700%	across	the	UK	as	a	whole	but	by	almost	7,500%	in	London,	and	yet	within	that	period	there	have	been	no	fewer	than	four	major	booms	and	busts	(see	Figure	1),	the	causes	and	consequences	of	which	will	be	briefly	reviewed	below	in	order	to	more	fully	develop	the	evidence	for	regional	divergence	.	
Figure	1.	Year-on-Year	Percentage	Change	in	Prices	for	All	Dwellings	by	Region	The	first	boom,	in	1971–73,	saw	average	prices	almost	double,	rising	by	almost	40%	p.a.	before	Chancellor	Anthony	Barber	dramatically	raised	interest	rates	in	November	1973	by	5	
percentage	points	to	try	to	put	a	stop	to	rising	prices.	This	initiative	proved	successful	and	the	boom	came	to	an	abrupt	halt,	but	a	property	and	secondary	banking	crisis	ensued	as	high	mortgage	and	borrowing	rates	of	about	15%	played	havoc	in	the	market	and	led	to	a	four-year	slump.	A	second	boom	in	the	period	between	1978	and	1980	went	largely	unobserved,	with	inflation	eroding	any	gains	by	1983.	Prices	subsequently	took	off	again	with	a	much	larger	third	boom	in	the	1980s	culminating	in	Chancellor	Nigel	Lawson	sharply	raising	interest	rates	to	10%	in	1988;	again	with	predictable	effects.	Both	booms	were	the	result	of	loose	money	policies.		The	early	1990s	slump	that	followed	Lawson’s	increase	was	probably	the	longest	and	most	severe	of	the	post-war	period	(Gentle	et	al.	1994;	Hamnett,	1993,	1998).	Housing	market	turnover	fell	by	over	50%,	nominal	prices	fell	by	almost	10%	p.a.	in	some	regions	(real	prices	by	much	more)	and	millions	of	households	faced	negative	equity.	During	this	deep	and	long	term	slump	some	commentators	suggested	that	the	UK	housing	market	might	never	recover	and	that	the	era	of	house	price	booms	was	permanently	over	(see	Hamnett	1998	for	a	discussion).	Of	course,	this	subsequently	proved	not	to	be	the	case,	but	it	was	not	until	about	1995	that	the	housing	market	began	to	recover.	Table	1	provides	a	summary	of	price	data	at	five	year	intervals	from	1970-2015.	The	long	fourth	boom	saw	prices	rise	steadily	year-on-year	from	about	1995	until	2007,	when	the	crisis	brought	this	boom	to	an	abrupt	end.	One	of	the	key	issues	that	the	long-run	divergence	hypothesis	puts	into	play	is	whether	London’s	rapid	recovery—particularly	visible	in	the	post-2010	phase—is	a	marker	of	a	new	dynamic,	or	simply	the	herald	of	a	5th	boom	that	has	only	just	begun	to	diffuse	outwards	from	the	overheated	core	where,	even	with	median	household	earnings	of	£671	per	week	(ONS	2016),	average	prices	in	the	3rd	quarter	of	2016	stood	at	£1.9	million	in	Kensington	&	Chelsea	and	£1.5	million	in	Westminster.	This	issue	is	particularly	topical	given	a	sharp	increase	in	‘stamp	duty’	on	sales	over	£1m	in	the	2016	budget	and	the	‘Help	to	Buy’	scheme	which	offers	a	mix	of	loans	and	guarantees	for	new-build	purchases,	especially	by	first-time	buyers	(HMG	2017),	to	help	get	younger	households	‘on	the	ladder’.			
Regional	variation	over	time	The	pattern	of	change	in	Figure	1	can	make	it	difficult	to	see	how	there	could	be	a	growing	North/South	divide,	so	it	is	helpful	to	normalise	each	region’s	prices	against	the	national	average:	Figure	2	shows	the	percentage	difference	between	average	regional	prices	and	the	overall	UK	average—obviously	incorporating	sales	in	all	regions—and	highlights	the	cyclical	aspect	of	the	RHPG	on	which	most	research	has	focussed	(see	the	extensive	review	provided	in	Cook	and	Watson	2015).	Four	things	emerge	from	the	graph:	first,	prices	in	London	and	the	South	East	are	consistently	higher	than	those	of	all	other	regions;	second,	there	is	a	stable	long-term	hierarchy	of	prices	with	London	at	the	top	and	the	North	at	the	bottom;	third,	the	size	of	the	RHPG	is	at	its	greatest	when	prices	peak	in	London;	and	fourth,	the	size	of	the	gap	subsequently	narrows	again	when	prices	in	the	peripheral	regions	begin	to	rise	while	prices	in	
London	and	the	South	East	stabilise	or	fall.	Crucially,	this	pattern	seems	to	have	(temporarily?)	ceased	in	about	2005.	
Figure	2.	Percentage	Difference	between	Regional	and	United	Kingdom	Reference	Prices	It	is	possible	to	discern	three	periods	during	which	the	gap	narrowed	appreciably,	roughly:	1971–77,	1989–83,	and	2003–05.	Of	course,	these	are	not	quite	the	periods	that	we	associate	with	the	property	booms	whose	beginning	and	end	points	were	defined	by	London-based	commentators.	Nonetheless,	it	is	also	clear	that	the	magnitude	of	the	gap	was	increasing	even	before	the	onset	of	the	GFC:	the	span	between	1998	and	2001	marks	a	significant	widening	of	the	RHPG,	even	though	the	rest	of	the	UK	began	to	catch	up	in	2003.	However,	it	is	the	period	since	2010	that	seems	to	suggest	a	transition	to	a	different	regime:	while	much	of	the	rest	of	the	UK	saw	little	or	no	recovery,	prices	in	London	pulled	away	quickly,	reaching	180%	of	the	national	average	by	the	end	of	2015,	and	it	is	not	difficult	to	see	that	with	a	RHPG	of	this	size	there	are	major	obstacles	to	labour	migration	and	major	problems	of	affordability	in	London.	
A	widening	gap?	We	can	also	examine	the	RHPG	using	London	prices	as	the	benchmark	against	which	to	compare	each	region.	It	is	clear	from	Figure	3	that	prices	in	South	East	were	closely	linked	to	prices	in	London	until	the	early	1990s,	but	that	in	the	last	20	years	the	size	of	this	gap	has	begun	to	widen	significantly.	In	1990	average	prices	in	the	South	East	were	at	near	parity	with	those	in	London,	but	by	2010	they	stood	at	79%,	and	by	2014	they	had	fallen	to	69%	of	those	in	London.	Note	too	the	spatial	sorting	that	emerges	ever-more-strongly	for	the	English	regions:	the	ranking	of	prices	over	the	great	majority	of	this	period	is	effectively	what	we	would	get	when	ranking	each	region	by	its	distance	from	the	capital.	Although	the	evidence	that	house	price	rises	have	consistently	started	in	London	and	then	diffused	outwards	has	been	developed	elsewhere	(Hamnett	1998,	Meen	1999,	Cook	and	Watson	2015),	Figure	3	remains	a	clear	summary	of	the	effect.	
Figure	3.	Percentage	Difference	between	Regional	and	London	Reference	Prices	However,	the	critical	point	in	Figure	3	is	that,	in	the	aftermath	of	the	GFC,	although	the	short	recovery	in	the	Midlands	and	North	between	2007–09	would	appear	to	support	the	‘status	quo’,	the	RHPG	quickly	began	to	expand	again	in	late	2009.	This	raises	important	questions	about	the	general	presumption	in	favour	of	convergence:	in	1969,	just	prior	to	the	first	house	price	boom,	average	prices	in	London	were	167%	those	of	the	North	East,	but	as	of	2015	that	figure	stood	at	286%.	This	chart	also	helps	us	to	understand	how	London	has	opened	up	such	a	large	gap	with	the	other	regions:	the	boom	of	the	early	2000s	and	the	recovery	beginning	in	2010	pushed	London’s	overall	gains	far	ahead	of	the	other	regions.	It	now	seems	clear	that,	on	average,	London	prices	in	2017	have	stopped	rising	and	have	even	gone	into	reverse	at	the	top	end	of	the	market	in	central	London	(RICS	2017).	Recent	quarterly	and	monthly	price	data	suggest	that	
prices	in	the	Midlands	and	the	North	are	beginning	to	increase,	indicating	a	new	phase	in	the	cyclical	variations	observed	in	the	RHPG.	At	the	regional	scale	it	may	therefore	be	more	appropriate	to	describe	regional	house	changes	in	Britain	as	being	characterised	by	both	a	cyclical	fluctuation	in	the	size	of	the	gap	over	time	and	a	progressive	widening	of	the	gap	between	London	and	the	rest.	If	this	is	correct,	then	it	raises	important	questions	about	the	causes	of	the	growing	gap:	is	it	simply	a	result	of	growing	differences	in	economic	structure	and	prosperity—particularly	given	London’s	global	importance	in	finance	and	advanced	business	services	such	as	law,	advertising,	consulting,	and	culture—and	the	occupational	and	income	differences	this	generates?	Or	is	it	also	a	product	of	London’s	role	as	a	focus	for	international	inward	investment?	We	would	suggest	that,	historically,	the	gap	was	largely	explicable	in	terms	of	London’s	industrial,	occupational	and	income	structure	with	an	over-representation	of	higher	income	groups	compared	to	the	peripheral	regions;	however,	the	growing	internationalisation	of	residential	property	market,	lead	us	to	suggest	that	the	capital’s	attraction	as	a	global	investment	destination	may	also	play	a	significant	role,	particularly	in	the	central	boroughs	which	attract	large	numbers	of	overseas	investors	and	speculators.		
Price	Change	within	London:	a	role	for	international	capital	flows?	In	recent	years,	London	has	become	an	increasingly	attractive	home	to	international	capital	looking	for	a	business	or	leisure	pied-à-terre,	a	safe	haven,	a	good	return	on	investment,	or	even	a	luxury	‘dorm’	for	a	child	at	university	(Atkinson	et	al.	2016;	Badarinza	and	Ramadori	2016;	BNP	Paribas	Real	Estate	2015;	Fernandez	et	al.	2016;	Knight	Frank	2013;	Murphy	et	al.	2017;	Sá	2016;	Savills	World	Research	2014;	Scanlon	et	al.	2017).	Principally,	these	are	buyers	of	‘new	build’	developments,	although	the	international	wealthy	undoubtedly	also	buy	period	properties	in	areas	of	central	London	like	Kensington	and	Chelsea.	Overall,	it	is	thought	that	overseas	buyers	accounted	for	10.5%	of	new	build	purchases	in	2014,	13.1%	in	2015,	and	17.9%	in	2016	(Wallace	et	al.	2017,	p.7);	and	the	13%	figure	is	one	with	which	the	British	Property	Federation	(2013)	and	Scanlon	et	al.	(2017)	appear	to	broadly	concur.	The	distribution	of	this	inward	investment,	however,	is	highly	uneven	with	different	types	of	investor	active	in	different	parts	of	the	city.		In	so-called	‘Prime’	London—the	central	boroughs	of	Kensington	&	Chelsea,	Westminster,	and	City	of	London—evidence	from	the	estate	agents	(Savills	World	Research	2014)	suggests	that	approximately	50%	of	all	sales	in	central	London	are	now	made	to	overseas	buyers	and	that	this	proportion	rises	to	over	70%	for	properties	priced	over	£2	million.	Quite	how	this	squares	with	the	contention	a	year	later	that	“…	over	85%	of	prime	buyers	live	and	work	in	London,	even	if	many	of	them	originate	from	overseas”	(Savills	World	Research	2015)	is	difficult	to	determine.	The	British	Property	Federation	(2013)	also	find	that	49%	of	Prime	London	sales	were	to	overseas	buyers.		
This	effect	can	also	be	seen	in	Vancouver	where	Chinese	buyers	now	account	for	50%	of	buyers	in	some	areas	of	the	city	(Ley	2017)	and	even	as	far	afield	as	New	Zealand	where	foreign	investors	seem	to	be	driving	growth	at	the	top	end	of	the	housing	market	(Geenty	and	Pannett	2016).	Given	that	there	is	a	strong	association	between	higher-value	properties	and	under-	or	non-occupancy,	and	that	overseas	owners	were	more	likely	than	domestic	ones	to	have	under-used	property	(Wallace	et	al.	2017).	A	few	headline	figures	from	Kensington	&	Chelsea	point,	again	indirectly,	to	the	overall	impact	of	overseas	activity:	the	borough	has	the	lowest	number	of	residents	with	UK	passports	(61%),	but	was	top	for	EU	passports	(20%)	and	second	highest	for	the	proportion	of	Arab	residents	(4%)	after	Westminster	(8%).	And	over	a	period	where	London	as	a	whole	grew	rapidly,	Kensington	&	Chelsea	actually	saw	a	decline	in	population	between	2001	and	2016	of	about	5,000	residents	(Baker	2012;	ONS	2017),	which	strongly	suggests	some	form	of	displacement	effect.	Westminster,	the	other	borough	of	particular	interest,	has	seen	significant	international	net	migration	in	excess	of	10,000	residents	per	annum	(ONS	2017).	However,	in	Inner	and	Outer	London	the	picture	is	very	different:	here,	the	greatest	proportion	of	sales	to	overseas	investors	are	in	‘new	growth	areas’	(31%)	such	as	Camden,	Greenwich,	Southwark	and	Tower	Hamlets,	and	in	Inner	London	boroughs	(32%)	such	as	Hackney,	Islington,	Lewisham	and	Hammersmith	&	Fulham	(Wallace	et	al.,	2017,	p.8).	The	British	Property	Federation’s	figures	(2013)	are,	perhaps	understandably,	lower:	they	suggest	that	overseas	buyers	accounted	for	20%	of	activity	in	Inner	London,	and	7%	in	Outer	London.	So,	with	the	exception	of	a	few	‘signature’	transactions	such	as	the	purchase	of	most	of	the	2012	Olympic	Village	by	the	Qatari	royal	family’s	property	investment	firm	(Kollewe	2011),	there	is	limited	overseas	activity	in	Outer	London	even	though	it	has	a	much	larger	share	of	new-build	properties	overall.	It	is	the	spatial	distribution	of	investment	that	helps	to	explain	why	half	of	all	new-build	sales	to	overseas	buyers	are	thought	to	have	been	at	values	below	£500,000	(Wallace	
et	al.,	2017);	this	places	the	majority	of	such	transactions	firmly	outside	of	Prime	London	and	highlights	the	existence	of	discrete	markets	in	London	and—as	was	observed	in	Australia	(Rogers	et	al.	2015)—in	terms	of	overseas	buyers.		There	is	thus	good	reason	to	think	that	the	sub-regional	scale	is	important	in	thinking	about	how	pricing	changes	are	transmitted	across	time	and	space	(Ferrari	and	Rae	2013;	Gray	2012).	The	finer	scale	data	makes	it	obvious	that	significant	variation	within	London	needs	to	be	taken	into	account.	The	London	Data	Store—which	uses	publicly-available	Land	Registry	data	and	so	dates	back	only	to	1996—highlights	the	gulf	that	now	separates	the	most	and	least	expensive	boroughs:	Kensington	and	Chelsea	has	an	average	property	price	more	than	nine	times	that	of	Barking	and	Dagenham.	London	itself	therefore	exhibits	signs	of	spatial	differentiation	with	prices	in	Central	London	increasingly	detached	not	only	from	Outer	London,	but	also	from	parts	of	surrounding	Inner	London.	This	is	clearly	shown	in	Figure	4:	by	early	2016	Outer	London	
prices	had	reached	194%	of	the	UK	average	and	Inner	London	prices	reached	268%.	But	in	the	central	boroughs,	after	a	short	setback	in	2008–9	prices	recovered	strongly	and,	even	if	they	have	now	fallen	back,	have	far	exceeded	the	peaks	reached	in	previous	cycles.	
Figure	4.	Percentage	Difference	in	Price	between	Selected	London	Boroughs	and	United	
Kingdom	Reference	Prices	It	is	this	pattern,	which	bears	no	obvious	relationship	to	domestic	trends,	that	has	led	commentators	to	focus	on	the	role	of	overseas	investment	in	pushing	up	prices	(e.g.	Goldfarb	2013,	Boesler	2013;	Fernandez	et	al.	2016;	Norwood	2016;	Wildau	2017).	There	is	already	evidence	in	a	time	series	covering	the	period	between	1973	and	2008	to	suggest	that	London	“…	is	influenced	by	international	developments	through	its	link	to	New	York	and	other	financial	centres”	(Holly	et	al.	2011,	p.2).	And	Fohoohar	(2017)	argues	that	‘world	property	markets	have	become	totally	disconnected	from	national	economies’.	This	calls	into	question	the	utility	of	purely	national	analyses	of	inter-regional	house	price	movements	in	countries	where	one	or	more	cities	are	simultaneously	embedded	in	global	markets.	Instead,	global	price	differentials	and	investment	opportunities	may	lead	to	growing	intra-national	price	differentials	as	some	cities	become	investment	destinations	while	other	cities/regions	cater	largely	to	local	demand.	This	mechanism	would	lead	to	long-run	price	divergence,	rather	than	convergence,	even	as	rising	prices	in	prime	areas	lead	to	‘spatially	displaced	demand’	(Hamnett,	2009)	both	within	London	and	beyond.	To	the	extent	that	overseas	buyers	have	become	increasingly	important	in	Central	and	Inner	London	it	can	be	argued	that	they	have	played	a	role	in	pushing	up	prices	in	outer	London	as	well.	Since	space	in	the	Prime	boroughs	is	highly	constrained	and	it	is	the	underlying	availability	of	land	itself	that	may	be	driving	appreciation	(Knoll	et	al.	2015),	it	is	reasonable	to	expect	spillovers:	some	high-earners	who	would	have	at	one	time	settled	in	Kensington	&	Chelsea	or	other	choice	bits	of	West	London	are	now	looking	a	bit	further	out	(e.g.	Hamnett,	2009).	As	importantly,	these	displaced	bankers	will	take	their	expectations	of	what	a	‘fair’	price	for	a	property	in	an	attractive,	but	not	quite	so	expensive,	area	should	be:	these	expectations	‘anchor’	(Tversky	and	Kahneman,	1974)	property	prices	for	buyers	and	sellers	at	a	new	level	with	the	result	is	that	ever	more	‘ordinary	Londoners’,	who	are	not	able	to	put	down	£4–500,000+	for	a	one	bed	apartment,	are	effectively	priced	out	altogether.	At	the	U.K.	scale,	evidence	developed	by	Ferrari	and	Rae	(2011)	suggests	that	it	is,	in	fact,	the	most	deprived	groups	who	are	displaced	the	furthest	because	their	choice	of	destination	is	‘spatially	constrained’.	The	complicating	issue	is	that	it	is	difficult	to	disentangle	the	overseas	investor	effect	from	the	overall	boom	in	buy-to-let	investing	which	saw	prospective	landlords	snap	up	48%	of	all	new	homes	built	in	London	(British	Property	Federation	2013);	however,	if	overseas	buyers	account	for	almost	a	third	of	buy-to-let	activity,	this	makes	them	major	contributors	to	this	dynamic	(ibid.).	One	reason	for	this	preponderance	in	the	new-build	market	is	that	unlocking	financing	
for	major	residential	development	projects	is	often	dependent	on	pre-sales	of	up	to	60%	of	properties	to	off-plan	buyers,	and	the	fact	that	the	U.K.	mortgage	market	has	few	products	to	support	this	kind	of	delayed	transaction	(Scanlon	et	al.	2017,	pp.21–23).	As	a	result,	many	projects—particularly	in	times	of	domestic	crisis—are	largely	or	wholly	depending	on	buy-in	from	risk-tolerant	overseas	buyers	and	it	is	thought	that	this	may	have	‘lessened	the	negative	impact	of	credit	constraints’	post-GFC	(Mardsen,	2015).	
The	‘Brexit’	effect		Of	course,	Britain	is	in	2017-18	in	the	throes	of	a	new	crisis	entirely	of	its	own	making:	long-term	uncertainty	over	the	shape	of	‘Brexit’	has	cooled	the	‘Prime’	market	considerably.	The	British	Property	Federation	(2013,	p.16)	had	argued	that	reasons	for	purchasing	in	London	included:	political	stability	with	support	for	inward	investment;	an	absence	of	restrictions	on	overseas	owners;	an	avoidance	of	the	difficulties	afflicting	Euro-zone	countries;	superb	long-run	returns;	currency	advantages;	and	the	fact	that	many	buyers	have	either	lived	in	London	or	have	family	living	or	studying	there.	Brexit	has	called	several	of	these	assumptions	into	question	with	a	period	of	profound	instability	over	the	future	of	the	U.K.	following	the	referendum	and	ill-fated	election,	and	a	growing	perception	that	the	political	winds	with	respect	to	migration	and	overseas	ownership	have	shifted.	Perversely,	while	an	increase	in	the	‘stamp	duty’	charged	on	more	expensive	properties	in	April	2016	is	thought	to	have	led	to	a	softening	of	demand	up	to	a	point,	the	post-referendum	devaluation	of	the	pound	has	also	made	UK	property	15-20%	cheaper	and	had	the	effect	of	attracting	new	buyers	by	offsetting	the	additional	rates	(Scanlon	et	
al.	2017).		More	problematically—if	you	are	an	investor—is	the	risk	of	a	Brexit-driven	migration	of	highly-skilled	and	highly-paid	workers	out	of	London	and	the	impact	that	this	might	have	on	overall	demand.	Given	the	limited	progress	in	the	negotiations	at	the	time	of	writing,	it	seems	increasingly	likely	that	the	banks	relocate	parts	of	their	operations,	especially	those	associated	with	Euro-trading,	to	sites	inside	the	E.U.	such	as	Dublin	and	Frankfurt	at	the	start	of	2018,	and	that	other	sectors	in	which	the	U.K.	currently	excels,	such	as	Higher	Education,	will	also	face	significant	negative	impacts.	However,	this	warning	does	carry	some	important	caveats:	the	risk	is	not	strictly	of	an	overnight	exodus	of	companies	and	workers,	but	of	a	slow	decline	in	the	importance	of	London	relative,	principally,	to	New	York	in	the	case	of	finance,	and	other	cities	in	other	sectors.	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	the	continued	importance	of	U.K.	law	for	contracts,	mergers,	and	other	complex	transactions,	as	well	as	the	overall	depth	of	its	markets	and	advantageous	time	zone	(e.g.	Clark	and	Thrift,	2004);	the	sheer	scale	of	London’s	financial	services	and	supporting	industries	will	be	impossible	to	replicate	overnight	anywhere	else	in	the	world,	let	alone	in	Frankfurt	or	Dublin.		It	may	therefore	not	matter	as	much	as	commonly	thought	what	kind	of	Britain	emerges	one	day	in	early	2019:	a	low-tax	haven	might	not	be	significantly	more	attractive	to	overseas	
investors	in	London	property	than	one	in	which	overseas	buyers	are	actively	discouraged	via	modest	additional	taxation.	Although	this	might	displace	some	of	the	activity	around	‘signature’	properties	in	Prime	London,	there	is	probably	little	that	would	completely	put	off	investors	who	have	seen	London	both	as	a	good	one	way	bet	for	the	last	20	years,	and	as	a	place	offering	an	attractively	accessible	mix	of	amenity	and	security.	In	comparison,	Switzerland	has	for	some	years	operated	a	much	more	draconian	quota	system	which	sharply	limits	the	number	of	new	overseas	buyers	to	1,300	per	year,	broken	down	by	canton	and	commune.	The	Swiss	approach	has	worked	quite	effectively	to	restrict	the	impact	of	overseas	buyers	and	investors,	but	this	not	only	clearly	means	that	global	capital	flows	into	property	assets	are	likely	to	head	elsewhere	(i.e.	to	London)	it	is	also	fairly	clear	that	such	a	policy	is	unlikely	to	be	replicated	by	Britain	where	it	would	likely	lead	to	a	further	decline	in	housing	production.		Although	the	nature	of	Britain’s	expected	departure	from	the	E.U.	is	still	unclear,	the	impact	on	London	property	is	likely	to	be	driven	largely	by	the	interaction	between	London’s	attractiveness	to	foreign	investors	and	the	ongoing,	and	fundamental,	dearth	of	new	housing	(CBRE	2014).	In	the	decade	to	2013,	London	is	thought	to	have	grown	by	more	than	a	million	people,	but	over	the	same	period	the	construction	of	new	homes	was	only		200,000	(British	Property	Federation	2013).	The	supply	of	housing	has	therefore	increased	very	slowly	relative	to	aggregate	demand,	so	the	‘additional’	demand	from	foreign	buyers	would	contribute	to	increasing	prices	.	But	even	a	severe	‘hard’	Brexit	that	hit	London’s	economy	hard	appears	unlikely	to	put	such	a	dent	in	housing	demand	as	to	lead	to	across-the-board	declines;	far	more	likely	is	a	period	of	stagnation	and	low	volumes	as	both	investors	and	owner-occupiers	in	Inner	and	Outer	London	sit	tight	and	wait	to	see	what	kind	of	country—and	set	of	housing	policies—emerges.		Although	the	data	provided	by	the	Land	Registry	is	not	yet	available	in	the	consolidated	annual	open	data	that	we	used,	the	most	up-to-date	overview	of	sales	provided	by	Savills	Research	(2017)	suggests	that	the	areas	popular	with	overseas	investors	and	buyers	have	weakened	significantly,	with	Central	London	bearing	the	brunt	of	a	15%	fall	since	2014	thanks	to	changes	in	tax,	finance,	and	transaction	costs.	However,	this	comes	on	the	back	of	a	decade	of	unprecedented	gains	and	substantial		(paper)	wealth	for	owners	across	all	of	London	and	it	therefore	still	seems	that	the	RHPG	has	been	reset	at	a	new,	higher	level	than	ever	before.	Intriguingly,	Ferrari	and	Rae	(2013)	distinguish	between	a	period	of	‘coherence’	in	U.K.	property	prices	from	1970	to	1986,	and	a	subsequent	one	of	‘divergence’;	this	transition	coincides	with	the	increased	financialisation,	and	‘opening	up’,	of	housing	markets	in	which	such	inward	investment	flows	are	necessarily	implicated.	
Conclusions		The	past	45	years	have	seen	the	emergence	of	a	marked	Regional	House	Price	Gap	(RHPG)	in	Britain	that	is	characterised	by	a	sharp	and	growing	difference	between	average	prices	in	London	and	those	in	the	peripheral	regions.	The	size	of	the	gap	has	varied	with	the	stage	of	the	housing	cycle,	leading	to	a	strong	evidence-base	for	a	ripple	effect;	however,	in	this	article	we	have	highlighted	that	the	size	of	the	RHPG	has	also	been	increasing	over	time	and	argue	that	this	poses	a	problem	for	those	who	anticipate	some	kind	of	inter-regional	convergence	on	either	a	relative	or	an	absolute	basis.	Given	what	has	happened	in	London,	we	cannot	fully	explain	the	current	RHPG	without	incorporating	global	capital	flows	and	international	migration	into	the	picture,	and	this	seems	to	be	an	important	omission	from	the	convergence	literature	and	the	types	of	policy	recommendations	that	flow	from	its	assumptions.	Existing	policy	levers	in	the	U.K.	seem	incapable	of	coping	with	a	market	that	exist	in	two	very	different	contexts	at	the	same	time	and,	in	the	absence	of	a	major	rethink	of	the	discretion	afforded	the	Mayor	of	London	by	the	national	government	,	this	situation	looks	set	to	continue	indefinitely.	The	implicit	assumption	in	neo-classical	economics	that	regional	differences	in	house	prices	should	tend	to	equalise	over	time	seems	misplaced,	particularly	in	a	world	where	prices	may	reflect	not	just	national	differences	in	incomes	and	prosperity	but	also	international	investment	flows.			Measured	as	a	ratio	of	the	England	and	Wales	average,	prices	have	risen	formidably	in	the	past	15	years:	as	of	September,	2016	average	prices	in	London	reached	2.06	of	the	national	average,	Westminster	stood	at	5.35	and	Kensington	and	Chelsea	at	a	remarkable	multiple	of	6.76.	This	suggests	that	cumulative	divergence	may	be	a	more	appropriate	way	to	view	regional	house	price	changes	in	Britain.	The	link	observed	between	New	York	and	London	prices	by	Holly	et	al.	(2011)	suggests	that	the	divergence	in	growth	rates	between	Central	London	and	the	rest	of	the	UK	should	be	understood	in	part	in	terms	of	the	capital’s	global	city	status.	The	post-GFC	data	appears	to	highlight	the	weakness	of	approaches	that	either	rule	out	or	underestimate	the	role	of	the	exogenous	factors;	our	argument	is	that	the	interplay	between	these	two	distinct	trends	in	property	prices—the	‘ripple	effect’	linked	to	employment,	income,	and	mobility,	and	the	inward	‘pump	effect’	in	Prime	London—has	worked	in	concert	to	increase	prices	in	the	capital	relative	to	the	rest	of	the	UK.	Either	way,	it	is	clear	is	that	the	role	of	international	investment	and	its	interaction	with	local	demand	from	both	mortgaged	and	cash	buyers	needs	to	be	much	more	closely	examined	in	those	cities	which	are	most	deeply	integrated	into	what	we	might	call	a	‘global	property	market’	as	it	may	have	large	local	effects	on	demand,	prices	and	affordability,	and	consequently	on	the	types	of	policy	levers	that	are	available	to	local	and	national	governments.	
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